

Sand dunes in Namib Desert

PART TWO: THE LANDSCAPE

Chapter Three

Broad layers of influence

This first outlook presents the African landscape through global historical spectacles. It attempts to connect the economic, political, and cultural fields to create a cohesive understanding of the societal forces affecting educational endeavours such as a national teacher education reform in an African state. It looks at the emerging hegemony of the global expansion of capitalism, informationalism, and network society. It looks at the effects of the imported official knowledge of development and the common sense of modernisation through schooling. These aspects are interrelated entities and are considered to create a fuller understanding of the possibilities and constraints for education reform.

The hegemonic global perspective

Capitalist expansion has inverse effects upon the centres and the peripheries of the system; in the first it integrates society, on which the nation is based, and in the second it destroys society, eventually destroying the nation itself, or annihilating its potentialities.¹

After the disintegration of the Eastern Bloc, the collapse of its version of industrial statism and the disappearance of Soviet state communism as a political system, capitalism was given free scope to develop as the dominant economic system from the beginning of the 1990s.² This global revolution, which kicked off with an accelerated globalisation of

¹ Amin op. cit. p. 68.

² Statism has been described by Castells as "a specific social system oriented toward the maximization of state power" as opposed to capitalism "in which surplus is appropriated by the holders of control in economic organizations". "While capitalism is oriented toward profit-maximizing, statism is oriented toward power-maximizing". Castells (1998) op. cit. pp. 7-9.

international capital, the development of informationalism and the emerging network society, coincided with the declaration of independence in Namibia. These externally driven trends and the internal changes in the Namibian society created an unexpected new situation, with optimism for the future.³ Namibia was not in a situation where strict measures of structural adjustments were called for from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, or the donor communities. At an early stage the World Bank was instrumental in setting up the so called Task Force on teacher education. This was done through one of its educational agents, who had a lot of personal and educational goodwill in the Southern African region because of his previous involvement with Science education in Zimbabwe. The World Bank also tried to get involved in the future development in teacher education. However, the Minister of Education did not accept the Bank's offer to finance the building of new teacher education colleges on the conditions that it also wanted to get involved in the software, i.e. the development of the teacher education programmes. The situation opened up for a new and pluralistic donor market and opportunities for donors to get some relevant experiences before moving on to South Africa.⁴ Modernisation was on the agenda and would be effectuated through the demands for multiparty parliamentary democracy and donor support.

The recent globalisation trends as described and analysed by Amin and Castells, both significant scholars and thinkers in the area of global

³ SWAPO had been a liberation movement heavily dependent on military support from the Eastern Bloc and had amongst its top leadership a significant number of people who rhetorically subscribed to the ideologies of the Eastern Bloc including Marxist-Leninist ideas. With the new international situation such ideas disappeared almost entirely from the official political arena, creating almost a total national consensus for the remaining and prevailing international idea of capital generation through market-orientations.

⁴ Changes in South Africa were expected already in the beginning of the 1990s in connection with the release of Nelson Mandela. Many donor agencies saw their entrance in Namibia, a country of minor international significance, as a relevant experience for a future official engagement in South Africa, the regional super power.

issues, seem to have similar effects on Third World countries as colonialism, i.e. further dependency and marginalisation, even though with some modifications. In that sense, the modern urban enclaves in many African cities are today in such a state that no temporary visitor from Western Europe would miss any of the latest symbols of (post)modernity, being it cell-phones networks, computers, e-mail cafés, or the latest BMW models. Today, Sub-Saharan Africa is characterised by "the incorporation of some minuscule sectors of some countries into global capitalism, as well as the chaotic de-linking of most people and most territories from the global economy".⁵ The hope that the recent globalisation trends will bring people closer to each other, which seem to be the message of the globalisation proponents, will probably turn out as empty slogans for the majority, while further supporting a skewed global order. As a US-based expert in nationalism, revolutions, and empires has put it, "of all the forces facilitating empire at present, globalization may turn out to be the most powerful".⁶

How did the present marginalisation develop for Sub-Saharan Africa after decades of attempts for European-styled modernisation of the independent African states? Castells argues that we cannot understand the current predicament of the weak nation-state in Sub-Saharan Africa without linking it to the political economy in the past decades. In the 1960s the lifeline for the local peasantry was destroyed by large-scale agricultural production for export and autarkic industrialisation without African markets. In the 1970s indebtedness accelerated and the invention of structural adjustment programmes aggravated the social conditions for the masses. The furtherance of the economic crisis, an accelerated depth crises and demands for structural adjustment in the 1980s diminished the resources even further and politicians started to foresee an approaching legitimacy crisis. This crisis was turned into a political economy of

⁵ Castells (1998) op. cit. p. 113.

⁶ Motyl, A.J. (1999) *Revolutions, Nations, Empires. Conceptual limits and theoretical possibilities*. New York: Columbia University Press. p. 151.

begging, large-scale illicit trade, and a disintegration of nation-states through clientelistic political ethnicism. Chabal & Daloz, two scholars with African background now operating from bases in UK and France, elaborate on the African crisis, but from a somewhat different perspective.

Our argument is that it is the decline in the resources available for patronage rather than dissatisfaction with the patrimonial order per se which has undermined the legitimacy of political elites on the continent.⁷

This point illustrates the strong logic of clientelistic reciprocity in African politics that alters the context within which we should place the international demands for liberalisation, representative and parliamentary democracy, human rights, etc. as conditions for foreign aid. In political terms, the clientelistic reciprocity turns the political act of casting your vote, which we in the Western world consider as an individual expression of choice, into ties of solidarity. While the Western view of society is based on conceptions about the "modern legal and rationale state, the emergence of individualism and the assertion of class identities", the African informal political order is based on "a system grounded in a reciprocal type of interdependence between leaders, courtiers and the populace".⁸ This system still works, not according to the Western logic, but "to maintain social bonds between those at the top and bottom of society".⁹

What happens in African states today is that the democratic transition, according to the Western paradigm, is reinterpreted locally and with it, African political identity. In this respect Chabal & Daloz address five areas of importance that are summarised here.¹⁰

⁷ Chabal, P. and Daloz, J-P. (1999) *Africa Works. Disorder as political instrument*. Oxford: James Currey and Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. p. 37.

⁸ Ibid. p. 44.

⁹ Ibid. p. 44.

¹⁰ After Chabal and Daloz op. cit. pp. 50-56.

- The boundaries of politics are much broader in the African society, thus anything related to human life, even the occult, can be politically significant.
- The view of the individual is also inclusive in the sense that individuals are foremost seen as members of communities. Becoming 'modern' does not exclude collectivity. The African is first a collective being through kin, ethnicity, etc. and then a single citizen of the state.
- As a consequence political legitimacy springs from the collective being rather than from the citizenship in the modern state.
- From this follows that representation is also communal or collective. A political representative will embody the qualities and virtues of the community and is expected to further the communal interests.¹¹
- Political opposition gets a different meaning in this situation. A political opposition with no means to deliver the needed communal resources through the political system is instrumentally useless, besides the long term ambitions to gain political power.

A consequence of the last point is that multiparty competitions "may have serious unintended effects and may even prove to be deeply destabilizing" as electoral failure will have far-reaching negative communal consequences.¹² Motyl's statement related to the discussion of modern nation-states is worth noting here as "parliamentary competition accentuates the "groupness" of groups and thus provides elites with ready-made vehicles for their ambitions".¹³ In the worst cases these forces work together and accelerate the dichotomising tendencies in the society

¹¹ Officially there are 35 recognised traditional authorities in Namibia, which is an indication of the social structure in the Namibian society. When the Ministry of Regional, Local Government and Housing recently called for the registration of tribal authorities they received 213 applications which further reflects the social importance of ethnic identity. Amupadhi, T. (2000) Too many chiefs, too few followers. The Namibian, website edition, 19-09-2000. <http://www.namibian.com.na>

¹² Chabal and Daloz op. cit. p. 69.

¹³ Motyl op. cit. p. 112.

as new elite strata of politicians in opposition are formed that cannot deliver to the populace.

Chabal & Daloz conclude their analysis with some notes on productivity and the political instrumentalisation of disorder. The Western conception of modernity includes a strong demand for productivity as it is seen as the key element for economic development and therefore essential for achievement and consequentially for deferred reward. The opposite is the case in Africa, according to Chabal & Daloz, where achievement within the modernised parts of society is "found in the immediate display of material gain - that is consumption rather than production".¹⁴ They state that the scope for reform becomes limited as "where disorder has become a resource, there is no incentive to work for a more institutionalized ordering of society".¹⁵ Thus, in the absence of other ways to sustain neo-patrimonialism, "there is inevitable a tendency to link politics to realms of increased disorder, be it war or crime".¹⁶ They conclude,

There is therefore an inbuilt bias in favour of greater disorder and against the formation of the Western-style legal, administrative and institutional foundations required for development.¹⁷

These analyses are such that if read dogmatically, they can support the common perception of Africa as a doomed continent or even impinge on racist notions, which the authors also note themselves. However, they acknowledge that "political elites operate on a number of different registers - both modern and traditional".¹⁸

¹⁴ Chabal and Daloz op. cit. p. 160; See also Lopes, C. (1994) *Enough is Enough! For an Alternative Diagnosis of the African Crisis*. Discussion Paper 5. Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies.

¹⁵ Chabal and Daloz op. cit. p. 162.

¹⁶ Ibid. p. 162.

¹⁷ Ibid. p. 162.

¹⁸ Ibid. p. 161.

It holds true that from the perspective of Chabal & Daloz donor aid fills a function in the African society, even though not the intended one. These authors are also sceptical about recent trends in the international donor community where supporting the civil society through e.g. non-government organisation (NGOs) is seen as a way to achieve modernisation yet outside the political state apparatus. They claim that the strong neo-patrimonial reciprocity will find its way into the NGOs and thus undermine this modernisation strategy.

The African state is no more than a decorative pseudo-Western facade according to Chabal & Daloz. If that holds true aid administrators who distribute development aid through a Western efficiency rationality can expect surprises in the future. The recent trend of sector support within a partnership rhetoric - even with its less partnership oriented hidden agenda - is incapable of changing or might even further feed the clientelism that Chabal & Daloz have addressed.

Challenging the official knowledge of the development business

In these closing years of the twentieth century the time has come for the lords of poverty to depart. Their ouster can only be achieved, however, by stopping development assistance in its present form ...Perhaps when the middle men of the aid industry have been shut out it will become possible for people to rediscover ways to "help" one another directly according to their needs and aspirations as they themselves define them, in line with priorities that they themselves have set, and guided by their own agendas.¹⁹

Is Hancock's call for an end to the present mainstream aid business a valid option? The evidence that Hancock and other scholars have collected over time is overwhelming. *Yes* is the answer to this question if we aim for development in terms of standardised western modernisation. Our moral

¹⁹ Hancock, G. (1992) *Lords of Poverty - the power, prestige, and corruption of the international aid business*. New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press. p. 193.

responsibility tells us that we still have to find ways to meet the needs of the toiling masses of the Third World. A critical solidarity paradigm beyond the present global order of marginalisation, polarisation, and structural violence, which is also accelerated by the aid business, can be the answer.²⁰ Amin's analysis of the historical critics of development in the Third World from both modern and postmodern positions on the Right and the Left sides of the political scale relates also to development co-operation. According to Amin there is a tendency amongst donor agencies to divert attention from the real issues of development, i.e. development as expansion of capitalist modernisation. Instead donor agencies become concerned about fashionable currencies like awareness of gender, cultural, or environmental issues. Even though undeniably important, such currencies can divert the attention from the holistic to the specific. According to Amin, "development agencies have become extraordinarily clever in handling these matters, changing their rhetoric without ever challenging established regimes".²¹ Alternative approaches, he suggests, need to be developed that address theoretical and practical dilemmas related to the connection between the universal and the particular.²²

We have to be able to design practical action programmes linking democratization with social advancement, with sufficient courage to implement effective policies within such a framework and to deal boldly with the risk of conflict that arises from the thrust of capitalist expansion.²³

²⁰ See for example Hancock op. cit. pp. 160 - 161; Amin op. cit. pp. 142 - 146. The recent development of organisations like Attac is a growing sign of a new type of critic of the prevailing order that often is reduced to another expression of youth protests by the establishment while other observers see it as a broader type of mobilisation on the global arena.

²¹ Amin op. cit. p. 146.

²² Here the universal is related to global issues and the particular to cultural, social, political and economic variations on national/regional levels.

²³ Amin op. cit. p. 146.

Odora Hoppers, an African scholar working in South Africa, has attended to the issue of international aid and its link to structural violence and power. She relates conceptualisations of aid:

- as an invisible way to exercise power,
- as a way to further the self-interest of the donor countries,
- as a way to exercise mind control,
- to feed a stratum of international consultants, and
- to uphold global capitalism.²⁴

These critical notions seem to have overwhelming effects on Third World countries and are the major crux of international aid, which from this perspective can be summed up as aid for self-help for the already affluent countries in the North. Swedish aid has a reputation of breaking with this mainstream agenda and is said to apply a more humanistic approach that for example has been documented through the long-term support to liberation movements in Southern Africa.²⁵ However, the broader shifts in Swedish development aid over the last 40 years from a solidarity to a market orientated paradigm is an indication of the Swedish adaptation to the international mainstream agenda following the broader political trends in the Swedish society. The changes in aid are sometimes officially motivated by a self-critical analysis of previous mistakes in development co-operation but can also be explained by the general penetration of the political thinking of economism and marketism into the field of international co-operation. As Samoff puts it in relation to the World Bank activities during the 1990s: "conventional wisdom on analyzing and

²⁴ After Odora Hoppers, C. (1998) *Structural Violence as a Constraint to African Policy Formation in the 1990s. Repositioning Education in International Relations*. Stockholm: Institute of International Education. pp. 74 - 84.

²⁵ Two recent publications give a full account of the Swedish humanitarian support to liberation movements in Southern Africa. These are: Sellström, T. (ed) (1999:a) *Liberation in Southern Africa: Regional and Swedish Voices*. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet; and Sellström, T. (ed) (1999:b) *Sweden and National Liberation in Southern Africa*. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet.

understanding education came to reflect the perspectives of economists and bankers".²⁶ Policy change under the slogan *Partnership Africa* is a recent example of this longitudinal shift in emphasis that follows the global trend of unconditional convergence towards the prevailing global economic order.²⁷ This convergence calls for counter-action through an urgent institutionalisation of a critical policy paradigm in the African societies that will also have far-reaching consequences for international co-operation.

An alternative model of development, one that would in fact be more socially and environmental sustainable, is not a utopia, and there is an abundance of realistic, technically sound proposals for self-reliant development models in a number of countries, as well as strategies for Africa-centered regional cooperation. In most cases, they assume the necessary partial de-linking of African economies from global networks of capital accumulation, given the consequences of current asymmetrical linkages.²⁸

What Odora Hoppers calls "Public Policy Dialogue" can play a role in a critical policy paradigm.²⁹ Public Policy Dialogue is characterising dialogue as reciprocal elucidation involving planners, practitioners, and civil society, and thus also the diversity of perspectives this broad representation creates. As Odora Hoppers puts it:

²⁶ Samoff (1998:a) op.cit. p. 8.

²⁷ Andrén, G., Bjerninger, J., Brolin, E., (1997) *Partnership Africa/Partner med Afrika*. Stockholm: Utrikesdepartementet. See also Dahlström, L. (1997:a) Gärna partnerskap - men med fortsatt bistånd! (Partnership is welcome - but with continued aid!) In *Omvärlden*, No. 5. pp. 36-37, for a critic of this policy.

²⁸ Castells (1998) op. cit. p. 128.

²⁹ Odora Hoppers op. cit.

This can enable science to be seen in its correct perspective as one way of *knowing*, one way of *seeking knowledge*, but also one which cannot replace *experience*. Science, experiential knowledge and politics have to come together in the framework of a human-centred development.³⁰

Public Policy Dialogue involves a shift in the forum for critical facilitation, negotiations, and communication "around pertinent developmental and policy issues" beyond the "ivory towers, old boys club" or academic networks.³¹ This is related to the role of academics and scholarship and Odora Hoopers claims that the role and positioning of the analyst (scholar, researcher) must also change.

The role of the analyst becomes one of active human agency and commitment, fully aware of that the role of representative institutions in social democratic politics is constrained and distorted by the obvious inequalities of power.³²

Odora Hoppers links this to African researchers in particular and claims that they could benefit from Gramsci's notion of *organic intellectuals* as a way to attend to the demystification of bourgeoisie ideology and the unmasking of false universality. Within a critical policy paradigm spaces can be opened for creative and transformative action in pursuit of social justice.

The modern school as exported to Africa

Following the theme of this outlook a move closer to education practices would still entail a combination of universal and particular perspectives. Therefore, Fuller's discussion of *The Western state builds third-world schools* is a relevant starting point.³³ What Apple explains as a conscious

³⁰ Odora Hoppers op. cit. p. 193.

³¹ Ibid. p. 193.

³² Ibid. p. 191.

³³ Fuller, B. (1991) *Growing-up Modern. The Western State Builds Third World Schools*. New York: Routledge.

way by the people in power to redirect attention from the real source of economic crises to the school has, by Fuller, been expressed as the reflexive turn to schooling for the treatment of "a variety of social maladies".³⁴ It is true for many places and for diverse political camps, from left to right, that schooling often has been turned into the representative battleground for ideological differences. This confirms that schooling matters for social development both directly as a site for social activities, influences, and promises for mass opportunity and indirectly as being this battleground over ideology.

When Fuller addresses schooling in Africa he does it by characterising the African state as a fragile state. This fragile state is manifested in its need to "nurture interdependence with other institutions using it as a stage upon which the ideals and symbols of the liberal polity are enacted".³⁵ The introduction of mass schooling acts both as a way to boost Westernised modernisation and to signal the illusion of mass opportunity. However, mass opportunity will not arrive unaided. At the same time political leaders of the fragile state need to nurture the "mediating authority of local collectives".³⁶ All this will subvert the state's legitimacy, according to Fuller, and create the fragile state.

This analysis can be compared to the one by Chabal & Daloz reported above. Instead of drawing the conclusion of a fragile state, they conclude that what is considered as disorder from the Western perspective works, when seen from the African perspective.³⁷

³⁴ Apple (1996) op. cit. p. 119; Fuller op. cit. p. 2.

³⁵ Fuller op. cit. p. 9.

³⁶ Fuller op. cit. p. 10.

³⁷ Castells has put forward another concept, the 'bifurcated state', that according to him survived independence and represents the Westernized state/ethnicity authority parallelism in today's African states. Castells (1998) op. cit. pp. 106 - 107.

[Within Africa] mass schooling has become a key strategy for signaling modern institutional change, particularly the coming of Western ideals and the arrival of mass opportunity.³⁸

Fuller argues that the macro agenda of the central state sets the mass conditions in the classrooms. This is broadly done through the following penetrations:

- The state enforces bureaucratic forms and rituals (tidy class schedules, ritualised lesson plans, breaking down complex tasks into simple behavioural entities) that signal modern bureaucracy.
- The state produces curricula that contain Western forms of knowledge and symbols, which further strengthens parallelism in African societies.
- The state sanctions a moral order, which is perceived as superior to the indigenous forms of authority and knowledge.
- The state sets up the mass conditions in the classroom, which leaves the teacher in a situation where the ritualised school, as we know it in Africa, becomes the rational norm.
- All this is further enforced by a situation where each child's virtue and worth is judged along the same secular criteria which emphasise memorisation of sacred fact and bits of knowledge.³⁹

Serpell, who studied the effects of schooling in a district in Zambia, claim that the controversies over the Western package of schooling can only be solved through a more inclusive strategy.

³⁸ Fuller op. cit. p. xvii

³⁹ After Fuller op. cit. pp. 132 -133.

If schooling is to be a source of empowering enlightenment rather than an instrument of domesticating indoctrination, its intellectual content must recruit the creative imagination of the growing child. And if the consequences for the local community are to be cultural enrichment and socio-economic progress rather than debilitating social conflict, cultural demoralisation and economic stagnation, an active dialogue is required among the varied perspectives of its multiple interest groups.⁴⁰

Serpell believes that this can be done through "a radical redefinition of what constitutes modern education, incorporating the best of both cultures, a synthesis born of egalitarian discourse".⁴¹ He relates this to the following implications for the rethinking of educational planning and policy: schools as nodes for reform, a focus on an alternation of curriculum content, an expansion of the clientele for schooling, an enlarging of the local service functions of schools, and an increased flexibility of access.⁴²

One of the basic features of schools in Africa is that they are operating in an environment that for the great majority consists of forms of life, work, economy, family and conviction that are different from the transnational modernistic way of life and culture spreading over the world. This transnational modernistic culture is spread based on the claim to be the expression of the universal truth about man and society. It eliminates the chance of a constructive growth process involving other cultures and ways of life. Schooling under independence in Africa has to a great extent continued colonial schooling and therefore supported this transnational, modernising culture. The question remains whether schooling can create a new way out of the confrontation between tradition and modernism? Can schooling reverse the process of being an instrument for the unconscious destruction of civilisations, without allowing people to participate in this

⁴⁰ Serpell, R. (1993) *The significance of schooling. Life-journeys in an African society*. Cambridge: University Press. p. 4.

⁴¹ Ibid. p. 278.

⁴² Ibid. pp. 266 - 276.

globalisation process in other ways than as victims, except for an urban middle class minority?⁴³

In spite of the overwhelming evidence that schooling has a reproductive role in society and that it persists in operating according to a conservative charter, even after a liberation struggle where its critical role has been emphasised, there is also evidence of the contrary, according to Samoff. "Notwithstanding the pervasive sense of crisis, Africa has seen significant experiments and innovations, some strikingly successful", even though in many cases not sustained after the initial enthusiasm, due to a combination of local and structural reasons.⁴⁴

Annotation: a constraining global layer for reform

At independence everything in Namibia was in flux and the land of many faces, diversity, and contrast - as Namibia is often portrayed in the tourist brochures - continued to live up to its reputation not only for the tourists. A new political leadership, new institutions and new programmes emerged at the same time as the socio-economic situation for the majority of Namibians remained the same or even deteriorated. All expected change both those who wanted it to be fundamental and revolutionary and those who feared that their privileges could be infringed. Teacher education reform became one of the strongest forces in the attempts to move education in a radical direction.

In the midst of this situation, teacher education reform after independence began based on an agenda of secular radicalism with traits of collectivism, critical pedagogy, democracy, and social development through participation.⁴⁵

⁴³ Based on Callewaert, S. (1995) A postgraduate education programme and related issues concerning teacher education for basic education in Namibia. Okahandja: NIED/TERP Document; and Dahlström, L. (ed) (1998) op. cit.

⁴⁴ Samoff (1998:a) op. cit. p. 21.

⁴⁵ Callewaert (1999) op. cit. p. 230.

Teacher education reform was announced as a way to undo the previous system and to introduce something different. It also faced the contradictory effects of the broad forms of influence that have been addressed in this chapter. Thus, the accelerating globalisation trends that replaced the era of the cold war opened up the Namibian borders for international forces and the establishment of new alliances and hopes that contrasted the maintenance of an extremely askew distribution of wealth amongst the Namibian people.

The second-tier hierarchy installed by the apartheid ideology was replaced by a representative parliamentary system that gave SWAPO a two-third majority in parliament. A new type of *gravy train* started to roll in Namibia, one that had far reaching effects on the Namibian society including education reforms. This *gravy train* furthered the drive for individual climbing of social ladders, urbanisation and other negative aspects of modernisation.⁴⁶

Independence created a new market place for international development co-operation. This had the effect that a number of international and national donor organisations landed on Namibian ground. Some had their agendas already in their pockets and others had a more humble approach, but all with their own perceived preferential right of interpretation often operationalised through mandating sector analysis.⁴⁷

SWAPO entered the post-independence arena with a strong mandate to change formal schooling to something beneficial to all Namibians. Since then, the school system has gone through a number of significant changes for the better. However, many features of the distorted

⁴⁶ This *gravy train* was an expression used by the critical media for the tendencies by the new political elite to use their position to further their own benefits continuously since independence through elaborated medical and pension schemes, housing and car allowances and towering salaries. See for example Amupadhi, T. (2001) *Gravy train back on track*. The Namibian website edition, 11-05-2001.

<http://www.namibian.com.na>.

⁴⁷ Samoff, J. (1999) Education sector analysis in Africa: limited national control and even less national ownership. *Int. J. Of Educational Development*, 19, 449 - 272.

version of the modern school still prevail with their illusionary signals of mass opportunity. It is the combination of the broad forms of influence attended to in this chapter and the specific historical imprints on formal schooling in Namibia that contributed to the survival of a school that did not live up to its official promises.

Chapter four will address the historical imprints on education in Namibia that affected the common sense about schooling and reforms.

